Hiiraan Online

Friday September 13, 2024
By Hassan Hassan & Rana Mamdouh



Houthi fighters guard a captured ship, the Galaxy Leader, in the Red Sea in May 2024. (Mohammed Hamoud/Getty Images)

The history of conflict in the Middle East since the early 20th century can be broadly characterized as having gone through three main phases. Each of these phases molded internal Arab politics and the wider region for decades. The third one is still taking shape, but is no less consequential than the others, extending beyond the traditional lines of conflict in Arab countries and increasingly stretching into Africa and Afghanistan.

Conflict in the first period was largely driven by national liberation movements, initially fighting against colonial powers and Israel and later advocating for regional unity under the banner of pan-Arabism. Much of the postcolonial conflict then centered on specific parts of the region, primarily in West Asia — from Gamal Abdel Nasser’s campaigns championing pan-Arab nationalism beyond Egypt in the Levant and Yemen, to Saddam Hussein’s wars with Iran and Kuwait, and Hafez al-Assad’s meddling in Lebanon.

This was followed by a second phase, which can be seen as an organic outgrowth of the first and overlapped with it, characterized by the rise of Islamist forces and those attempting to counter them. Pan-Arabism had largely faded, replaced by the rise of pan-Islamist movements, with Turkey and Iran becoming more assertive in the traditional theaters of conflict. But while the players changed, the battlegrounds remained largely the same. Arab politics were for decades shaped by the push and pull of pan-Arab and pan-Islamist ideologies.

Now, the region is entering a new phase, one characterized by a departure from both pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism and defined instead primarily by the political and economic interests of the Gulf states. The Arab uprisings of 2011 marked a turning point, as the regimes in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Syria began to crumble or recede from regional leadership. Even those that remained stable, such as Egypt, have retreated inward. As the epicenter of regional power shifted to the Gulf states, the main drivers of regional conflict also changed.

No longer confined to the traditional hotspots or ideological fault lines, these conflicts have increasingly spilled into areas beyond Arab countries, including Africa and Afghanistan. There are historical precedents for major Arab powers providing support to African nations, as an aspect of anti-colonial and Cold War politics. In the early 1960s, Nasser sent Egyptian troops to Congo to support Patrice Lumumba’s government as part of his broader anti-imperialist and pan-Africanist agenda during the Congo Crisis. Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi sought to assert his influence in Africa through economic and political cooperation, and the Gulf countries have long pursued interests in the region — as Saudi Arabia did via the clandestine U.S.-led Safari Club alliance of intelligence agencies in the 1970s, and the United Arab Emirates has in Seychelles over the past two decades.

Still, these economic and diplomatic ties were not part of a strategy of establishing control or shaped by rivalry among countries of the region, as is the case in Africa today. (A similar situation is playing out in Afghanistan, where countries like Qatar, the UAE and Turkey are vying for influence by deepening ties with the Taliban.)

This new dynamic can help us better understand the drivers behind several recent developments in the region. For example, the Houthi attacks along the Red Sea have been examined by analysts — almost without exception — as reactions to Israel’s war with Hamas in the Gaza Strip and within the context of the fronts between Israel and the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.” However, this misses a more significant and long-term dynamic at play: It might be more accurate to view the attacks as linked to developments in the Horn of Africa.

Similarly, the escalating tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia over water rights, along with last week’s reconciliation between Cairo and Ankara, can be better understood through this lens, as can the wars in Sudan and Somalia.

As the Gulf states continue to assert their influence and international powers like Russia and China increase their involvement in Africa and Afghanistan, these patterns are likely to intensify and shape the future of Arab politics. One effect is that divisions are likely to proliferate and become entrenched in the conflict-ridden countries where these powers are involved, as they focus on achieving specific economic objectives by carving out limited zones of interest.

Take the ongoing conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt over water rights in the Nile.

Ethiopia completed the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on August 26, marking the dam’s transition to its operational phase. Costing $4.7 billion, construction of the Renaissance Dam began in 2011 despite objections from Egypt and Sudan, the downstream nations that depend heavily on the Nile’s waters. Numerous mediation efforts, including by the U.S., the World Bank and various Gulf and international actors, failed to secure an agreement protecting Egypt’s and Sudan’s water rights. The Nile is of vital importance for Egypt, providing over 14 trillion gallons of water annually, which represents 79% of the country’s total water resources and fulfills 95% of its water needs. Yet Ethiopia needs to harness a significant portion of the Nile’s flow to power the dam for hydroelectric energy.


A map showing the competing forces in the Sahel and Horn of Africa regions. (Illustration by Joanna Andreasson for New Lines Magazine)

While Addis Ababa celebrated the completion of the dam as a historic milestone, Cairo’s response came swiftly in Somalia. Just 24 hours after Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced that the Renaissance Dam would be fully complete by December, two Egyptian military planes landed in Mogadishu, loaded with soldiers, weapons and equipment. This was part of a larger deployment of 10,000 Egyptian soldiers under the defense agreement between the two countries. Ethiopia quickly hit back, transferring additional military forces to its border with Somalia. A spokesperson for Ethiopia’s foreign ministry warned that the country would not stand idle while external forces destabilize the region and threaten Ethiopia’s national security, referring to the aims behind these actions as “short-term and futile.”
The Egyptian deployment, officially framed as part of a military cooperation agreement, served a dual purpose: to bolster Egyptian participation in African peacekeeping missions in Somalia, and to block Ethiopia’s ambitions of securing a permanent outlet on the Red Sea. Crucially, the move ensures an Egyptian military presence near Somalia’s borders with Ethiopia.

These developments have heightened tensions between two of Africa’s regional powers, threatening to spark a military showdown and pulling in other countries in the neighborhood and beyond.

In early 2024, Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, a self-declared independent republic that Somalia considers part of its sovereign territory. Under this deal, Ethiopia would lease a 12-mile stretch of coastline along the Red Sea for 50 years, allowing it to build a military base. In exchange, Ethiopia would recognize Somaliland’s independence and offer a share of Ethiopian Airlines’ profits. In August, Ethiopia dispatched a high-level envoy to Somaliland, marking the first such diplomatic gesture by any country.
At its core, Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland is an effort to reclaim maritime access it lost in 1993 when Eritrea became independent, taking with it key ports on the Red Sea. Landlocked since then, Ethiopia has been reliant on Djibouti for 95% of its imports and exports, a costly dependence that the new deal aims to reduce.

The Ethiopia-Somaliland pact has angered its neighbors, particularly Somalia, which maintains that Somaliland — which it regards as part of its territory — cannot enter into international agreements. Addis Ababa’s gambit has also raised concerns in Djibouti, which stands to lose billions in port revenue, and in Eritrea, where fears of Ethiopian expansionism have grown.

Cairo saw an opportunity amid Ethiopia’s growing tensions with its neighbors — Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti — and was quick to condemn the Somaliland agreement. In January, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi made Egypt’s opposition clear, underscoring his country’s commitment to Somalia’s sovereignty and signaling a readiness to confront Ethiopia’s ambitions. Later, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Somalia, escalating the confrontation further.

While Egypt initially voiced its displeasure without taking immediate action, in mid-August it announced a military cooperation protocol with Somalia, focusing on training, intelligence-sharing and securing maritime routes. This is seen as a direct counter to Ethiopia’s growing influence in the region, enabling Egypt to be present near its border and aligning with Cairo’s broader strategy to curb Ethiopia’s ambitions — including access to the sea — and maintain a balance of power in the Horn of Africa.

This seemingly bilateral Ethiopia-Egypt dispute is further complicated by the involvement of other actors from outside the Nile Basin.
The UAE, Turkey, Israel and Iran have all made significant inroads into Africa. Egypt, once dominant in the Red Sea, is now attempting to regain influence, including through outreach to Somalia’s central government, while trying to navigate the interests of other regional and international actors in the region.

Turkey and the UAE, in particular, have for years had an established footprint in the Horn of Africa and beyond. This region, which includes Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Djibouti, holds strategic significance due to its key maritime routes, notably the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

Rivalry over the region first played out through long but low-key economic competition via alliance-building and military cooperation. With the conflict in Somalia and, more recently, in Sudan, such quiet diplomacy has given way to meddling and military interventions backing one side or the other, from the supply of Turkish drones to Somalia since 2017 to the UAE’s current backing of military forces in Sudan.

The growing tension between Egypt and Ethiopia has also reshaped regional alliances, with Egypt finding itself on the side of Turkey and Qatar against its former allies in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, culminating with the historic visit by Sisi to Ankara on Sept. 4, following a gradual thaw in relations between Turkey and Egypt in recent years, after the two countries had previously severed ties in 2013.

Egyptian-Turkish military coordination was taking shape in Somalia months before this visit. According to reporting by Al-Araby Al-Jadeed on Aug. 30, Turkish naval vessels arrived on Egypt’s coast in late August, preparing to head to Somali waters alongside Egyptian naval vessels. This activity reportedly coincided with the arrival of Egyptian military planes in Mogadishu, marking a coordinated effort between the erstwhile rivals.

Despite the rapprochement, Turkey is pursuing its own expansion strategy on the continent, gaining a firm foothold in Somalia since 2017 as part of its broader ambitions for maritime power projection as well as trade and investment across Africa. On Feb. 8, Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler and his Somali counterpart signed an agreement for defense and economic cooperation in Ankara. This agreement, officially approved by the Somali government and Parliament on Feb. 21, is set to last 10 years.

The deal includes opening Somali airspace and security zones to Turkey, establishing a joint naval force to patrol Somalia’s coast from Kenya to Djibouti with Turkish warships and soldiers, and providing training, technical support and equipment to the Somali army. According to Turkish sources cited by Al Jazeera, the agreement reflects Somalia’s urgent desire to prevent further deterioration of security in the region.

Somalia sought Turkey’s support as a direct response to the Somaliland-Ethiopia agreement. Ethiopia has also sought Turkey’s help to resolve its disputes with Somalia. During a visit to Ankara, Ahmed asked President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to mediate, leading to a July meeting in Ankara between the foreign ministers of both countries. No breakthrough was achieved.

The growing Gulf influence in the Horn of Africa has added another layer of complexity to the region’s geopolitics.

The Ethiopia-Somaliland deal was backed by the UAE, an ostensibly close ally of Egypt elsewhere. Abu Dhabi supports both Somaliland and Ethiopia, and part of the Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement involves the UAE building a new port. Some of the announced details of the pact are identical to a similar deal in 2018, which was abandoned in 2022, and which set a majority stake of 51% in the port for the UAE’s logistics company DP World and 19% for Ethiopia.

The port deal further intensifies the competition between Somalia, its allies and the Ethiopia-Somaliland-UAE axis. For Somalia, the Turkish defense agreement (and now Egypt’s) represents a counterbalance to the growing influence of the UAE and Ethiopia, particularly as Turkey already has its largest military base outside its borders in Mogadishu.

The UAE has maintained a presence in Somaliland since 2018, when President Musa Abdi announced that the UAE was training Somaliland security forces under an agreement to establish an Emirati military base, one year after Turkey provided similar military training to Somalia. The base, which began construction in 2017, is located at Berbera’s airport and will remain in place for 30 years. Berbera, less than 20 miles from Yemen, is a strategic location on the Gulf of Aden, and the UAE’s involvement there extends to broader economic interests in the Horn of Africa. (The UAE has also controlled the Yemeni archipelago of Socotra, near Somalia, since 2018.) In 2019, DP World, the major UAE-based port operator, launched a $101 million expansion of Berbera’s port, through which livestock — particularly camels — would be exported to the Middle East and goods such as food imported. The UAE’s power projection capabilities are primarily a function of its financial muscle and port development experience.

The UAE’s presence in Africa predates many of these new players and was not always driven by strategic rivalries. It built ties through economic relations with places like the Comoros Islands, Seychelles and resource-rich countries like Congo, Tanzania and Zambia. But its involvement is still new, most of it beginning only after 2009. (Among the Middle Eastern countries competing in the Horn of Africa, Israel is the oldest player, its interests dating back to the 1950s.)

Where Egypt and Sudan once held sway, the UAE now projects the most influence, while Saudi Arabia remains conspicuously absent. The UAE and Saudi Arabia continue to provide financial support to Egypt but have lost confidence in Sisi because of his economic mismanagement and are pursuing their own agendas. This further threatens to undermine Sisi’s government and exacerbate Egypt’s economic woes.

Saudi Arabia, like the UAE, backs Ethiopia, whether in its dispute with Egypt over the Renaissance Dam or in the recognition of the Republic of Somaliland. Riyadh and Addis Ababa agreed to boost bilateral relations in various fields in March, and signed an agreement in June to establish a joint Saudi-Ethiopian business council and collaborate on investments in Ethiopia, including in industry, agriculture and energy. In its official statements, Riyadh maintains its support for the unity of Somalia.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are also cooperating on port investments. In December 2019, the Saudi Ports Authority signed concession agreements with DP World to use Jeddah Islamic Port as a major shipping hub on the Red Sea. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE aim to increase the traffic to Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port through port development projects in the Horn of Africa.

Saudi Arabia has the longest coastline along the Red Sea, through which 20% of global trade and 70% of Saudi goods pass, enabling it to expand its port operations. According to an April 2020 report by the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh, Saudi investment is helping Ethiopia gain access to Red Sea ports. The report states that Ethiopia has signed port agreements with Sudan and Djibouti, and it has secured a 19% stake in Dubai Ports’ operations in Berbera in Somaliland. These agreements could help Saudi Arabia bypass the Strait of Hormuz when exporting its oil. Meanwhile, the UAE plans to build oil pipelines between the Eritrean port of Assab and Addis Ababa, and Saudi Aramco is continuing its projects to expand crude oil pipeline routes from the kingdom’s eastern region to the Yanbu port on the Red Sea.

Qatar was the third destination for the Somali president after his visits to Egypt and, earlier, Eritrea in January 2023. Qatar did not take a clear public position on the agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland following the visit. In June, Ethiopia and Qatar announced a two-track plan to enhance cooperation between Qatar and Somalia on one hand, and Qatar and Ethiopia on the other. However, Qatar has been a close ally of Mogadishu since 2006.

Doha is also deepening its ties with several other African nations, although its expansion of interest is less visible than that of the UAE. It has close ties with Rwanda and many of the Sahel countries. Its use of soft power has grown its influence even with individuals and groups in countries such as Mauritania that are perceived to be friendly to its Gulf rivals, the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Shortly after Israel’s war in Gaza began in October last year, global attention shifted toward the Horn of Africa. In response to the war, Iran-allied Houthi forces in Yemen targeted cargo ships passing through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, underlining the vulnerability of this crucial corridor for international trade. The region’s instability has become a growing concern for global powers, prompting increased military and security cooperation agreements aimed at securing these routes, countering Iran’s influence and curbing its arms smuggling in the area.

The Houthi attacks should not be viewed simply as a response to Israel, however, but as part of the developments playing out in the Horn of Africa. The attacks have a dual purpose on each side of the Red Sea. Within Yemen, the attacks are part of an Axis of Resistance strategy of escalation and raising the costs of the war in Gaza, as well as solidifying Houthi rule by rallying people behind the Palestinian cause and “Gaza-washing” the government’s domestic and regional image as a sectarian, Iran-backed militia that seized power by force. Across the sea, the Houthis are making their presence felt as disruptors near some of the world’s most vital choke points, with the goal of ultimately emerging as unavoidable partners in the Horn of Africa’s evolving security landscape. They are also destabilizing maritime routes to thwart any unified front against their interests on the other side of the sea. These maneuvers align with Iran’s broader strategy to extend its influence across Africa, from the Horn to the Sahel, echoing similar tactics employed in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria.

This calculation has brought together strange bedfellows: Yemen’s Houthis and Somalia’s al-Shabab. The Houthis and al-Shabab, both designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S., have established ties in recent months, working together to smuggle weapons and conduct other illicit activities from money laundering to disrupting international shipments. This continues a tradition of such cooperation between forces in Yemen and the Horn of Africa, exploiting long-standing networks that also operated under former regimes in Yemen. Despite ideological differences, the two groups also share common enemies and are united by these deep-rooted, resilient connections across the Red Sea. The current patterns in that region will likely endure and persist, including the Houthis’ activities along the Red Sea, because they are rooted in established local dynamics.

Iran has also built its own presence in West Africa, along with Hezbollah networks, using soft power and educational grants to expand its influence from Senegal to Nigeria. This growing Iranian footprint on the continent is a key reason for Israel’s increased attention to Africa, maintaining strong ties from Senegal to Uganda to Morocco and warily watching Hezbollah’s operations, which include money laundering and diamond smuggling. Israel provides security, military training, port management and technology (including in medicine, agriculture and espionage) across the continent. With their growing alliance after the normalization of relations in 2020, and considering that their interests in Africa seem to align, the UAE and Israel are expected to form a special partnership there, especially in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel.

Other Arab conflicts are also spilling over to Africa. Morocco, for example, has intensified its outreach to African nations to rally support for its territorial claim over Western Sahara, against the local resistance backed by neighboring Algeria. Rabat had withdrawn from the precursor of the African Union in 1984, after the body recognized the disputed territory as a sovereign state. Since it was readmitted in 2017, about two dozen African countries have rescinded that recognition.

Add to this mix international powers like Russia and China aiming to entrench their economic and political interests, sometimes by aligning themselves with allies of the West like the UAE against Western powers like France. The Gulf states are essentially emulating, on a much smaller scale, what China has long been doing in Africa: quietly building strong economic ties and filling power vacuums in nations across the continent.

Russia is playing a different game than others by pursuing a Cold War-style policy of toppling pro-Western regimes and replacing them with Moscow-friendly ones, from the Central African Republic to Sudan, aiming to create a strategic corridor from the Red Sea to the Atlantic.

Amid these changes, Russian interests are also intersecting with those of some of America’s traditional allies, such as the UAE. The Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, or “Hemedti,” have earned millions through control of gold mines and by sending mercenaries to fight for the Saudi-UAE coalition in Yemen. Hemedti has close ties with the UAE and has also cooperated with Russia’s Wagner Group, infamous for its operations in Syria, Ukraine and Africa.

Many of the power dynamics in the Red Sea and Africa are new, and it remains to be seen how they will ultimately unfold. For now, this shifting landscape has created unlikely alliances, such as between Egypt and Turkey, or between the Houthis and al-Shabab, while also dividing Gulf states over developments in the Horn of Africa and on the Nile.

On one level, these rivalries could be viewed as a failure of the Arab states to counter Iran — a scramble for influence on the region’s periphery after losing the geopolitical contest against Tehran in the heart of West Asia over the past decade. But even so, their expansion beyond the region is a significant story, marking a departure from previous conflicts.

The nature of these new Gulf-fueled conflicts will likely differ from what has come before, reflecting the political and economic ambitions of the Gulf powers, which go beyond rivalry with Tehran over countries like Lebanon and Syria. Even if they appear ineffective in the Middle East, the Gulf states are now leveraging their financial power to establish influence in new theaters, including Africa and Afghanistan, where they are reestablishing or deepening ties with the Taliban.

This use of financial power is also a function of size. While the Gulf states all have advanced militaries, they lack the heft of numbers that would allow them to patrol or pacify a country, even a relatively small one. That makes them more focused on supporting existing forces on the ground.

With the emphasis on economic interests and their limited abilities, the effects of these Gulf-led conflicts are not difficult to foresee. Gulf policies diverge from those of countries like Iran, which focuses on state capture through patient strategies that sometimes hurt its economic well-being in the process. Tehran’s strategy in places like Iraq and Lebanon has focused on enabling its allies to fully capture the state’s institutions and resources.

The Gulf states are incapable of replicating the Iranian formula of state capture. Instead, they are interested in territorial capture: They set their eyes on specific goals within their capabilities, which often means siding with one actor operating in a specific zone of interest, even if this leads to a splintering within a given country. Indeed, one can see that pattern in the places where Gulf countries have backed local actors: in Libya, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia and, to a certain degree, Syria. These policies have already either split nations or deepened existing divisions. This strategy reflects the limited capacity of these emerging powers to dominate a country and control its politics, as Iran and older Arab regimes have done in much of the region.

This, then, may be the legacy of the next round of conflicts fueled or backed by competing Gulf states: conflicts that are less about grand ideologies and more about the cold calculus of influence, resources and control.