By Muktar Ismail
16 July, 2022
Efforts to resolve the dispute, including the 2014
agreement, have failed, and so new approaches need to be explored.
Successive regimes in Ethiopia and the media have not given
much attention to the problems of pastoral communities in the country.
Most of the challenges facing these societies are assumed to
derive from intra-pastoral clan conflicts over access to pasture or water.
Because they are not seen as contests for power at the center, their hostility
is seen to have minimal or no influence on wider national politics.
This misconception has led state actors and civil society
organizations to downplay the challenges and political and economic
significance of pastoral communities living in peripheral regions.
The frequent violent clashes over disputed land along the
border between Afar and Somali regions have long been viewed as a nationally
insignificant conflict over natural resources.
But, this is misleading and will not help in mitigating the
recurrent conflict between the two communities.
The bone of contention is the administration of three
special kebeles in Afar that are predominantly inhabited by ethnic Somalis who
wish to be integrated into Sitti Zone of the Somali region and are backed by
the Somali region’s authorities. Meanwhile, Afars consider the area an integral
part of their region.
The kebeles lie on the southern edge of the Middle Awash.
They are Adaytu Kebele in Mille Wereda, Undufo Kebele in Gewane Wereda, and
Garba-Issa Kebele (Gedamaytu) in Amibara Wereda.
Historical claims
Historically, the conflict between Somalis and Afars has
indeed been mainly over natural resources like grazing lands and water,
including the Awash River. The watercourse is exceptionally valuable for
pastoralist communities of both regions who rely on it during the dry season.
However, since Djibouti became the primary trade outlet for
landlocked Ethiopia—after Eritrea’s independence in 1993—the dispute has taken
another twist and become politically charged.
As the main highway and railway between Addis Abeba and
Djibouti pass through these border areas, what was once a local rivalry has
transformed into a struggle to gain absolute ownership and control of this
vital corridor.
Afar’s narrative centers around the notion that these lands
were part of their historical pastureland and that Somalis’ northward migration
and establishment of permanent settlements is a deliberate strategy to annex
the territory.
Somalis’ claims are similarly rooted in history. The three
kebeles of Garba-Issa, Undhufo, and Adaytu are emblematic of the bitter
religious wars against the Ethiopian Christian Empire.
The first mention of the name “Somali” in Ethiopian history
dates back to the 14th century when Emperor Amda Seyon’s cavalry, who had just
conquered the Makhzumi Sultanate of Shewa, was met by Adal’s fierce resistance
in Wadi, located between Garba-Issa and Gewane.
It is this background that explains why the defiant Adal
soldiers have become Somali symbols of resistance. Moreover, this evidence
discredits Afar’s narrative of “recent” Somali migration to the area.
Until a century ago, the area was of marginal importance to
the rest of Ethiopia.
During Haile Selassie’s imperial era, central administrators
generally left pastoralists in the area to manage their own affairs and settle
disputes among themselves.
The central government’s intervention was generally limited
to disarming groups active in the area.
For instance, in 1963, when a Somali Issa armed group attacked a train
and killed a Frenchman, soldiers carried out a massacre in Ayesha, a Somali
town near the Djibouti border.
In the 1970s, the Derg regime built a road connecting
Ethiopia to Djibouti through Awash, which accentuated tensions in the area.
Kilil system
The formation of regional states along ethno-linguistic
lines was adopted in 1995 when the current Ethiopian constitution came into
effect.
Nine ethnic-based regions were established, but in some
instances the central government did not proceed to formally demarcate borders.
The administration’s reorganization can thus be considered incomplete, as it
failed to fully address existing problems and generated new ones.
In fact, given that it is hard to rearrange boundaries once
they are drawn, parties involved in demarcation negotiations tend to claim as
much land as possible. Accordingly, regional states’ demands invariably
misinterpret local histories and make allegations about the timeline of
different ethnic groups’ migrations, which further fuels polarization.
In this sense, in its current implementation, the federal
ethnic arrangement has exacerbated existing local conflicts and put additional
pressure on local administrators.
It is no surprise that regional states allocate a large
chunk of resources to train and arm local militias and regional special forces.
These are then used to fight against rival groups, sustaining violent border
confrontations.
Feuds of this type exist throughout the country, from
Metekel of Benishangul Gumuz region, whose incorporation into the region is
challenged by Amharas, to Wollo, claimed by both Oromo and Amhara, and Western
Tigray, which is at the heart of the Tigray war.
The standoff between Afars and Somalis is not the only
conflict the two communities are involved in either.
The Somali region has had border disputes with Oromia
regional state, which affected over 420 kebeles. In 2004, a referendum was held
to address them, but partly because the resulting demarcation has not been
implemented in most areas yet, violent clashes continue to periodically take
place.
Afars, motivated by nationalistic sentiments, have engaged
in clashes outside of Ethiopia. In the early 1990s, the armed group known as
Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD)—with strong support
among Ethiopian nationals in the Afar region—waged an armed struggle against
Djibouti’s government.
This crisis spilled back into Ethiopia as the Somali Issa in
Ethiopia supported Djibouti’s government, which was mainly composed of their
kinsmen. The international ramification of the conflict became apparent again
as recently as August 2021, when a confrontation between Somalis and Afars in
Ethiopia triggered violence in Djibouti.
Such border issues have been inherited by the current
administration, which has been unable to facilitate lasting solutions. Sadly,
the failure to resolve the Afar-Somali dispute has proved one of the most
costly in terms of lost civilian lives.
Border administration
When Ethiopia was reorganized as a federal state, the Somali
region started administering the Somali-inhabited areas of Garba-Issa, Undufo,
and Adaytu, while the Afar region took over other majority Afar areas.
Since then, the main demographic shifts have been linked
with the pursuit of some economic activities. In particular, Somali Issas,
moving freely among their kinsmen throughout the Horn of Africa, have been
involved in trade, including contraband activities.
As a consequence, the resident Somali community has grown
and many villages have appeared along the main highway, while Afars remained
detached and gained no benefits from these activities.
Even so, the three towns remained contested and were getting
basic services such as water, education, and health from Shinile Wereda of the
Somali regional state.
As a humanitarian worker for the World Food Programme (WFP),
I could observe this state of affairs myself while working in the area. The
borehole drilled in Adaytu and primary schools and health facilities in the
three towns were all run by the Somali region.
In 2014, to diffuse tensions around the longstanding
dispute, the then regional presidents of the Afar and Somali regions met in
Awash and signed a document recognizing the three kebeles as special kebeles
within Afar region.
The arrangement was meant to preserve the rights of
residents. Regrettably, its provisions have been ignored by the Afar
administration, which regards the delivery of basic public services as
encouraging the urbanization and growth of the Somali population in Afar.
The dire reality on the ground and public pressure forced
the Somali region to unilaterally withdraw from the 2014 agreement in 2018,
which has reignited the discussion around the legitimacy of Afar’s
administration of the kebeles.
Violence flare-up
For a long time, Somali residents have struggled to
understand why they have been incorporated as a minority in Afar and are still
deprived of their right to a referendum as enshrined in Article 39 of the
constitution. Still, for the better part of the last thirty years, the EPRDF`s
iron fist prevented any open resistance from emerging.
Recently, the collapse of the authoritarian governing
coalition encouraged the uprising of the residents of the Middle Awash. The
Somalis living in Garba-Issa, Undhufo, and Adaytu staged a demonstration on 16
January 2019 to voice their demand for the respect of their constitutional
rights.
To their dismay, the Afar region resorted to heavy-handed
repression which left protesters dead or injured and houses burnt down to
ashes.
In an unprecedented show of might, the Afar special police
raided some Somali villages, killing several people and leaving scores injured.
Furthermore, ‘Doko Hina’, an Afar State-funded youth movement, escalated the
conflict by interrupting the traffic along the trade corridor, triggering panic
among motorists in Addis Abeba and pushing them to flock to gas stations to
stock up on fuel.
Conflicts have been recurrent since. As recently as July
2021, the Somali authorities alleged that Afar militia “looted and massacred
hundreds of civilians” in Garba-Issa.
Somali special forces and actors of civil society have also
resorted to similar tactics. For instance, in 2021, Ahmed Humed, the deputy
police commissioner of the Afar region, blamed Somali regional forces for the
killing of about 100 civilians, many of them herders.
The political dimension of the issue has become more complex
too. High-level political tensions were highlighted in last year’s elections,
during which the National Election Board backtracked on its decision to
accommodate Somali’s interests in the kebeles.
Moreover, the conflict has recently triggered a political
uprising against the Somali regional government, which has been forced to take
a tougher stance on the problem, denouncing the killings of Somalis and
demanding accountability.
Towards peace
Efforts to peacefully solve the dispute in the past,
including the 2014 agreement, have failed, and it is now time to come up with a
better approach.
The focus should be on harmonizing traditional and modern
conflict resolution mechanisms. Elders from both sides should spearhead the
negotiation process. The inclusiveness and ownership of the process will give
the outcome legitimacy within both communities.
An Addis Abeba-led process without prior consultation with
locals would not be received well, and regional administrations have failed to
manage the process on their own.
Still, both the federal and regional governments have a role
to play, given that all steps they take are in consultation with local elders.
In all likelihood, the conflict will continue until a
binding agreement accepted by both is reached. But, until then, keeping all the
communication channels open—especially at the grassroots level—will prevent
minor skirmishes from turning into large-scale chaos.
Special forces and militias from the two regions should be
removed from the contested area and federal forces should be deployed there to
enforce law and order and ensure agreements reached are respected.
Once security is reestablished, all actors should support
the return of thousands of displaced people to their residences.
Afar region should accept the residents of the contested
areas, who are now under its region as per the 2014 agreement, by providing all
the necessary basic services. Extending such brotherly gestures can also
strengthen the relationship between the two communities and facilitate
reintegration.
Only after deescalating tensions and restoring trust should
a referendum be held to decide the fate of the three special kebeles.
Muktar Ismail
Muktar is a disaster prevention specialist, a former
humanitarian and development advisor to Somali region's president, and a former
UN staff member.