By: Adal Institute
Wednesday December 20, 2023
Since independence in 1960, various governments have underserved the Awdal Region. This apparent neglect might have been due to the geographical remoteness of the Region from the center of power (Mogadishu) and perhaps because of the lack of adequate representation of the Region at the national level. To be fair, it must be noted that some other regions in the country shared the same fate. However, the economic malaise of Awdal was worse than most of the other regions. Be that as it may, we believe that there was no deliberate intention from the central government of Somalia to marginalize the Awdal Region economically or otherwise.
General Yusuf Talan, a native of the Awdal Region who was trained at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in the United Kingdom, eloquently stated in one of his many speeches that the most effective method to marginalize a community is to simply deprive it from sources of revenue generation through inappropriate public finance policies and by blocking of infrastructure investment.
Despite not being an economist, what General Talan vocalized in 1992 is a textbook example of economic deprivation policies of the SNM regime of Hargeisa towards the Awdal Region. This economic marginalization is axiomatic and ubiquitous, for everyone to see and can be categorized into five dimensions, one which is internal or domestic to Awdal people while the others are exogenous.
The first factor (internal) relates to the absence of leadership in the Awdal Region. In the absence of a legitimate (recognized) government that is supposed to maintain law and order, provide public services (including basic infrastructure), and economic assistance to citizens, the role of community leaders becomes critical to the cohesion and survival of the Awdalities. Such leadership roles could have come from the traditional leader (Aqils, Sultans, Ugas) and/or from community`s intellectual leaders.
During Siad Barre`s rule, the roles of traditional leaders (Aqils, Sultans, Ugas, etc) were restricted and as such, there was no public discourse between the public and their traditional leaders. And although they were given salaries, their existence was merely ceremonial. Consequently, their importance within the community eroded significantly, creating a disconnect and lack of trust between the public and the traditional leader. Whereas most of the intellectual leaders left their regions of birth either towards the capital- Mogadishu or the Arabian Gulf in search of better jobs. As a result, a leadership vacuum was created in many regions of Somalia, with Awdal experiencing a significant share of this vacuum.
After the collapse of the Siad Barre`s regime, it was expected that Awdal intellectuals returning from Mogadishu would take the leadership role of the central government`s civil servants. Unfortunately, the clan-based militia (SNM), which captured Awdal with the help of the Ethiopian army had other ideas. They were motivated by clan supremacy, divide and rule along sub-clan lines, looting, and the eliminating of many of the Awdal intellectuals. Thus, further making the leadership vacuum worse. Those leaders (traditional, intellectuals) whom the SNM presumed to be transformational and/or have the audacity to speak for the benefits of their Awdal people were either killed (General Yusuf Talen, Cali Faarax Sayax, Mohamed Hassan, Mayor of Borama) or casted aside and replaced with ones who were more aligned with SNM objectives of depriving Awdal economically. Moreover, their meagre stipends were cut off and transferred to their replacements. The culmination of these tyrannical and the lack of employment opportunities forced most of the Awdal intellectuals and elders to migrate to other parts of world.
The annihilation of Awdal`s leadership was the starting point for the Somaliland regime to marginalize Awdal. The intended objective was to weed out transformational leaders who could rightfully represent the Region`s interest by playing a crucial role in attracting financial resources and investment to their communities and facilitating effective decision-making processes to the Region`s citizens. This has resulted in a lack of direction and purpose. In short, the absence of competent community-based leadership has negatively impacted Awdal`s development by making it harder to identify goals and priorities, secure resources, foster engagement, and hold people accountable.
The second factor pertains to customs duties imposed on imports and taxes, including taxes levied on passengers at Loyado border crossing. It is estimated that the total of these resources generated from above amounts to around 20 million dollars annually, of which a meagre amount of 150,000 (hundred and fifty thousand) accrues/retained in Awdal Region to pay the salaries of the customs and immigration staff of the Hargeisa regime. It is important to note the number of staff at Loyado and Zeila customs is 62 of which only 3 are from the Awdal Region. Moreover, the total VAT tax collected from Borama is estimated to be around 23 million dollars per year. These proceeds are directly taken to Hargeisa. Furthermore, The Awdal Region receives less than 4% of international economic assistance provided by international donors to Somaliland. It is estimated that such economic assistance amounts to USD 120 million per year. The inhabitants of the Awdal Region have been let down by the lack of oversight from donor countries to ensure that these donated development dollars reach the intended recipients.
The third dimension covers the Region`s infrastructure. Despite the sizeable revenues generated from Awdal, the Hargeisa regime did not undertake public expenditures in both soft and physical infrastructure and, as such, the state of the Region`s transport sector is underdeveloped. In addition to this lack of investment in the basic infrastructure, the Borama Airport which used to receive three to four passenger flights on daily basis was closed in 2000, denying the Awdal region a potential revenue of more than 5 million dollars per year. In addition to the closure of Borama Airport, international NON-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)that were based in Borama due to its safety were ordered to relocate to Hargeisa, further depriving employment opportunities for the people of Awdal. Moreover, the Somaliland authorities have not allocated any budget for the development of fishing port Zeila or Lughaya while at the same time allocating about 9 million dollars for the construction of Maydh fishing port. Furthermore, the Somaliland regime denied dhows coming from Yamen to dock and/or disembark at Zeila and Lughaya preventing a potential revenue of more than 20 million dollars per year.
As per the Somaliland Development Fund database on infrastructure investments, more than 95% of all infrastructure development projects were implemented and earmarked for the Isaq regions. It is obvious that the non-Isaaq inhabited regions are again getting the short end of the stick.
The willful neglect in allocating budget for basic transport sector infrastructure development has stifled Awdal`s economic growth and advancement. It's widely acknowledged that an efficient road system can significantly reduce travel time and costs for individuals and businesses and facilitate the connection between goods producers and consumers. For example, transporting a 40 MT payload by truck from Berbera to Borama is about 25% cheaper than the same payload to a closer location, despite Borama being roughly 45 Kilometers closer (276 km vs 237 km). This cost difference is primarily due to the unpaved and rocky road between Borama and Zeila, which impedes traffic, especially during the rainy season, whereas the road from Berbera to Borama is well-maintained tarmac.
The Fourth dimension is about the exploitation of natural resources. The Awdal Region`s land and seas treasure different kinds of natural resources. Awdal minerals include gemstones, emeralds, gold, aquamarine, ruby, sapphire, garnet, quartz, and opal, and many of these minerals are easily found close to the surface. Most of these minerals have been plundered with intensity through the issuance of mining licenses by the Somaliland Ministry of Energy and Minerals. Out of the 28 licenses issued by the Ministry, only two are awarded to people from Awdal, the rest are exclusively reserved and granted to Isaaq individuals or companies fronted by them at nominal fees. The Awdal seashore (spread along 300 km) is home to more than 200 types of fish, 150 of which are internationally marketable due to their high quality. Despite this long seashore in Awdal, the Somaliland regime has denied or discouraged fishing licenses to Awdal companies. Instead, the Authorities in Hargeisa signed agreements with foreign companies with large trawlers that scooped up the seabed without consideration for the environment. Moreover, these trawlers crushed small local fishing boats, resulting in injuries, loss of equipment and employment. Thus, Awdal is deprived of an estimated annual revenue of more than 100 million dollars per year.
The fifth factor relates to deliberate Political marginalization. In fact, this is the unmentioned elephant in the room. When you do not have a seat at the table, it is very hard to get your voice heard. The Isaq clan controls all branches of the Somaliland Government For example, the president, who is the supreme leader of Somaliland is from the Isaaq clan, the Chairman of the House of Elders is from Isaaq, the supreme court is headed by Isaaq, the commanders of military and police as well as all senior military and police officers are from the Isaaq clan. In addition, the leaders of three parties in Somaliland from the Isaaq clan. Moreover, 95 % of regional governors, ministries, Director generals (Permanent Secretaries) and senior civil servant are also from the Isaq clan.
Another example of Isaq -take-all mentality is manifested in the House of Representatives and House of Elders (Golaha Guurtida) whereby out of 82 members, only 20 are non-Isaaq. Another statistical fact evidencing the political marginalization of the Awdal region is the distribution of polling stations. Out of the 2,709 stations, less than 50 stations are earmarked for Awdal. On top of that, voter card registration is conducted for 4 to 5 days for a region with an area of 22 thousand square kilometres. A Region with a population of about one million and paved roads. It takes about three hours to reach a destination just about 40 kilometres far from Borama. Against this background, it is no wonder that the Awdal population has become disenchanted with the electoral process. As a result, voter turnout has remained very low. The above list of facts disproves the myth that Somaliland`s election system and procedures have been fair and transparent.
Conclusion:
The economic marginalization of the Awdal Region has been devastating, resulting in poor infrastructure, loss of revenue, and mismanagement of financial resources. The deliberate sidelining and or elimination of Awdal transformational leaders who could have played a crucial role in attracting funding for investment and effective facilitation of decision-making processes contributed to the economic deprivation of the Region.
The significant revenue generated from the Awdal region has been used as a slush fund for the Somaliland authorities in Hargeisa. In fact, Awdal has been and continues to be a cash cow for Somaliland authorities enriching their families and supporting the development of Isaq regions.
By: Adal Institute
[email protected]www.adal-institute.org